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THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN ECONOMIC
POWERS AFTER DAMES & MOORE v. REGAJ.:
LEGISLATION BY ACQUIESCENCE
Lee R. Markst &John C Grabow*
On January 19, 1981, President Carter entered into three agree-
ments with Iran to secure the release of fifty-two American hostages
seized in Teheran, Iran, on November 4, 1979.1 These agreements, en-
tered into without the advice or consent of the Senate, provided for the
termination of all legal proceedings against Iran pending in United
States courts,2 the nullification of all attachments and liens secured
against Iranian property,3 and the transfer to Iran by July 19, 1981, of
Iranian property held in the United States.4 The agreements also pro-
vided that, subject to certain exceptions, 5 claims of United States na-
tionals against Iran would be settled by artibration before a newly
created Iran-United States Claim Tribunal.6
In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 7 the Supreme Court upheld the Presi-
dent's authority to enter into and carry out the agreements with Iran.
The case was argued on June 24, 1981, and decided on July 2, 1981, on
a schedule expedited to enable the United States to meet its commit-
t Member, District of Columbia Bar; B.A. University of Michigan, 1957; LL.B.
Harvard University, 1960.
* Member, District of Columbia Bar; B.A. University of Michigan, 1978; J.D. Univer-
sity of Michigan, 1981.
1 The three agreements were: (1) Declaration of the Government of the Democratic
and Popular Republic of Algeria, Jan. 19, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 224 [hereinafter cited as General
Declaration]; (2) Undertakings of the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with Respect to the Declaration of the Govern-
ment of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Jan. 19, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 229; and
(3) Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Con-
cerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 230 [hereinafter cited as
Claims Declaration].
2 See General Declaration, supra note 1, 1 11, at 227.
3 Setid I B, at 224.
4 The agreement called for the transfer within six months of the date of the Declara-
tions of all Iranian deposits and securities held by American banks into an escrow account at
the Algerian Central Bank. Id 9 16, at 226.
5 The exceptions include all claims by hostages, claims arising under contracts specify-
ing that Iranian courts would be the sole forum for resolving disputes, and claims for damage
to United States nationals or property by "popular movements" in the course of the revolu-
tion. See infra note 38.
6 See Claims Declaration, supra note 1, arts. I-II, at 230-3 1.
7 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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ments to Iran.8 Recognizing its "expeditious treatment" 9 of questions
that "touch fundamentally upon the manner in which our Republic is
to be governed,"10 the Court repeatedly emphasized the narrowness of
its holding.'I
The Court upheld the President's extinction of attachments and
liens on the ground that the "plain language" of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act 12 (IEEPA) permitted such executive
action. The Court's holding, however, ignored both the legislative his-
tory of the IEEPA and its precursor statute, the Trading with the En-
emy Act' 3 (TWEA), and its own earlier admonitions against a literal
reading of the language of the two statutes.14 The Court also failed to
provide a conceptually solid foundation in upholding the President's au-
thority to suspend private claims pending in United States courts
against foreign nations, relying upon a theory of implied congressional
delegation through acquiescence that is without precedential support.15
To criticize the Court's conclusions is not to suggest that it should
have held otherwise. Given the unique context of the case, it is difficult
-to fault the Court for upholding the President's authority to enter into
the agreements with Iran. The agreements resolved a prolonged and
debilitating foreign affairs trauma. Once the hostages had been re-
leased, it was impossible to restore the status quo ante. The interna-
tional consequences of dishonoring the President's undertaking were
unpredictable. Limited to its unique facts, the Court's decision was tol-
erable as well as predictable. Unfortunately, the Court's analysis cannot
be limited to the facts of Dames &Moore. 16 Despite its professed caution,
to uphold the President's actions the Court was forced to rely on an
unprecedented reading of the President's statutory and constitutional
power to conduct foreign affairs. The case establishes a precedent that
8 President Carter had agreed to return bank deposits and other property subject to
attachment by July 19, 1981. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. A "controlling prece-
dent" from the Supreme Court upholding the President's authority to nullify attachments
and require the transfer of the property to Iran was needed before that date. Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari before Judgment, Memorandum for Respondents at 2, Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
9 453 U.S. at 660.
10 Id at 659.
11 Sceid at 660-61, 688.
12 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. IV 1980).
13 50 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (1976).
14 See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 100-17 and accompanying text.
16 Although the Court disclaimed any attempt to lay down "general 'guidelines' cover-
ing other situations not involved here," 453 U.S. at 661, Judge Bork of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit has properly noted in response that "an attempt to say
nothing of general guidance must always be defeated in some measure as soon as reasons are
given for the particular decision." Persinger v. Iran, 690 F.2d 1010, 1019 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 8,
1982); see infra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
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may cause serious mischief in the future and, therefore, cannot easily be
dismissed.
I
BACKGROUND: UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL
INTERESTS IN IRAN
The Imperial Shah of Iran had ambitious plans to modernize Iran.
Under his guidance, Iran was to become "the fifth-largest industrial en-
tity on the face of the earth by the year 2000."17 The Iranian govern-
ment and its agencies entered into hundreds of contracts with major
American corporations to carry out this program of rapid industrializa-
tion. United States companies equipped the Imperial Iranian Air Force
with sophisticated jet fighters, transport planes, and helicopters, con-
ducted site studies for nuclear power plants, upgraded the country's tele-
communications and highway systems, built irrigation projects, housing
complexes, and hospitals, and provided consumer goods.18
The Shah's regime, however, was fragile.' 9 Religious riots and anti-
Shah demonstrations erupted in early 1978, with the exiled Ayatollah
Khomeini calling for "rivers of blood" to bring down the Shah.20 By the
end of 1978, Iran was in economic and political chaos: oil production
was virtually shut down; workers were on strike; and demonstrations
were continuing. The Shah left Iran on January 17, 1979,21 and soon
after, Khomeini returned to Iran from his Paris exile. 22
The fall of the Shah not only marked the end of the world's oldest
monarchy, but also terminated the extensive commercial relationships
between American companies and Iran, leaving hundreds of contracts
in partial states of performance. Upon taking power, the anti-American
Islamic regime of the Ayatolla Khomeini renounced all dealings with
United States companies. American corporations suddenly found them-
selves with expropriation and breach of contract claims instead of con-
tracts for goods and services. The claims represented a value estimated
to be as much as eight billion dollars.23
To recover their losses, American corporations filed suits in United
States district courts throughout the country against the Islamic Repub-
17 W. SULLIVAN, MISSION TO IRAN 66 (1981).
18 See generally B. RUBIN, PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS: THE AMERICAN EXPERI-
ENCE AND IRAN (1980); K. McLACHLAN, THE IRANIAN ECONOMY 1960-1976, in TwENTI-
ETH-CENTURY IRAN 129-69 (H. Amirsadeghi ed. 1977).
19 Seegenerally W. FORBIS, FALL OF THE PEACOCK THRONE (1980); B. RuBIN,supra note
18; W. SULLIVAN, supra note 17.
20 B. RUBIN, supra note 18, at 6.
21 N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1979, at Al, col. 6.
22 Id, Feb. 1, 1979, at Al, col. 6.
23 See, e.g., Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69, 74 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd on other grounds, 657 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1981); see also IRANIAN AssETs LITIGATION REP.
(Andrews) 4238 (Feb. 19, 1982).
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lic of Iran and the agencies and instrumentalities through which Iran
had conducted business. They founded jurisdiction on the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act of 197624 (FSIA), which gives the district court
"original jurisdiction. . . of any nonjury civil action against a foreign
state. . . as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which
the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-
1607 of this title or under any applicable international agreement. ' 25
Section 1605 of the FSIA provides, inter alia, that a foreign state shall be
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States courts whenever it has
waived immunity or the claim is based on a "commercial activity" hav-
ing a nexus with the United States.26 The American claimants effected
service on Iran and its agencies pursuant to the FSIA, which prescribes
various modes of service including, when all else fails, service on the
United States Secretary of State and subsequent transmittal to the for-
eign state through diplomatic channels.27 Many plaintiffs obtained pre-
judgment attachments of Iranian property located in the United
States,28 including bank accounts, art, real estate, and Iran's remainder
interest in its Foreign Military Sales Trust Fund.
II
THE PRESIDENT'S ACTIONS
On November 14, 1979, in response to Iran's seizure of the Ameri-
can hostages and its threat to remove its assets from the United States,
24 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1976). See generaly infra notes 163-65 and accompany-
ing text.
25 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976).
26 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) provides:
A foreign state shall not be immune from thejurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case. . . in which the action is based
upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States
The FSIA provides a "minimum contacts" test of personal jurisdiction similar to that set forth
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See, e.g., Thos. P. Gonzalez
Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion, 614 F.2d 1247, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 1980).
27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1976). Seegenerally New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran
Power Generation & Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (when diplo-
matic channels are closed, FSIA and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit courts to order
a substitute form of service).
28 The FSIA authorizes prejudgment attachment only when the foreign state "has ex-
plicitly waived its immunity" therefrom. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d)(1) (1976). Because few com-
mercial contracts with Iran contained explicit waivers, most claimants relied on the 1955
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Article III, § 2, Aug. 15, 1955,
United States-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899, 902-03, T.I.A.S. No. 3853, at 4-5. The treaty provides gen-




President Carter declared a national emergency 2 9 and ordered all prop-
erty of the government of Iran within the jurisdiction of the United
States, or within the possession or control of persons subject to the juris-
diction of the United States, to be blocked. 30 The order authorized the
Secretary of the Treasury to exercise all powers granted to the President
under IEEPA to carry out the blocking order.
The next day the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Treasury
Department issued the Iranian Assets Control Regulations. These regu-
lations provided that "[u]nless licensed or authorized . . . any attach-
ment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial
process is null and void with respect to any property" in which Iran held
an interest.3 1 The Treasury Department later issued a general license
that authorized certain judicial proceedings against Iran, including pre-
judgment attachment, 32 but did not permit courts to enter final judg-
ments or decrees. 33
Iran released the hostages on January 20, 1981, pursuant to an
agreement reached the previous day between the United States and
Iran. 34 The terms of the agreement are embodied in three declarations
of the Republic of Algeria, which had mediated between Iran and the
United States.3 5 In return for the release of the hostages, the United
States agreed
to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving
29 The President declared a national emergency pursuant to IEEPA upon his finding
that the situation in Iran constituted an "unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its
source. . . outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of
the United States . . . ." 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (Supp. III 1979); see also STAFF OF HOUSE
COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., IST SESs., REPORT ON
IRAN: THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE HOSTAGE SETrLEMENT AGREEMENT 12-14 (Comm.
Print 1981) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON IRAN].
30 See Exec. Order No. 12,170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1980). The order applied to "all property
and interests in property of the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities and controlled enti-
ties and the Central Bank of Iran." Id For a detailed discussion of the decision to impose this
freeze on Iranian assets, see generally Gordon & Lichtenstein, The Decision to Block Iranian
Assets-Reexamined, 16 INT'L LAW. 161 (1982).
31 31 C.F.R. § 533.203(e) (1980).
32 Id § 535.418.
33 Id § 535.504(a).
34 For a discussion of the negotiations leading to the release of the hostages, see generally
Cutler, Negotiating the Iranian Settlement, 67 A.B.A. J. 996 (1981); The Iran Agreements: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-24 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Iran Hearingsj.
35 See Claims Declaration, supra note 1. A discussion of the validity of the Algerian
Declarations under international law is beyond the scope of this article. For a view that the
Declarations may be voidable under Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, U.N. Doc. T/Conf. 39/27, May 23, 1969, at 25, see generally Note, The Iranian Hos-
tage Agreement Under International and United States Law, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 822, 826-42 (1981);
Correspondence, VoidAb Initio: The U..-Iran Hostage Hostage Accords, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 347
(1981). But see generaly Lowenfeld, International Law and the Hostage Agreement, Wall St. J., Jan.
27, 1981, at 30, col. 3.
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claims of United States persons and institutions against Iran and its
state enterprises, to nullify all attachments and judgments obtained
therein, to prohibit all further litigation based on such claims, and to
bring about the termination of such claims through binding
arbitration.36
The United States further agreed to effect the transfer by July 19, 1981,
of all Iranian assets blocked in the United States, including those re-
strained by writs of attachment and preliminary injunctions.3 7 The
agreement required that one billion dollars of those assets be deposited
in a security account to satisfy any awards eventually rendered against
Iran by the Claims Tribunal created by the agreement.38
On January 19, 1981, the last day of his Presidency, President
Carter issued ten executive orders to implement the Algerian Declara-
tions.3 9 The orders revoked the license that had earlier permitted at-
36 General Declaration, supra note 1, 1 B, at 224.
37 Id 1 6, at 226.
38 The Claims Declaration creates the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal "for the pur-
pose of deciding claims of nationals of the United States against Iran and claims of nationals
of Iran against the United States." Claims Declaration, supra note 1, art. II, at 230. The
tribunal is to arbitrate all claims not settled within six months. It is comprised of three mem-
bers selected by the United States (George H. Aldrich, Howard M. Hotzmann, and Richard
M. Mosk), three selected by Iran (Mahmoud Kashani, Jehugir Sani [replacement for Hassein
Enayet] and Shefey Shafeiti), and three selected by agreement of the other six members (jus-
tices Nils Mangard of Sweden, Pierre Bellett of France, and the President of the Tribunal,
Justice Gunnar Lagargren of Sweden). Id art. III, $ 1, at 231.
The Tribunal operates in accordance with the arbitration rules of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) as modified by the Tribunal, id art.
III, T 2, at 231, and decides all claims "on the basis of respect for law, applying such choice of
law rules and principles of commercial and international law as the Tribunal determines to
be applicable." Id art. V, at 232. Any award that the Tribunal renders "shall be enforceable
. . . in the courts of any nation in accordance with its laws." Id art. IV, 3, at 232. The
Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over all claims against the Government of Iran except
those claims relating to the seizure of the American Embassy, the detention of the hostages or
the injury to the person or property of American Nationals by private individuals during the
Islamic Revolution. General Declaration, supra note 1, 11, at 227. The Tribunal also will
not adjudicate those claims arising under "a binding contract between the parties specifically
providing that any disputes thereunder shall be within the sole jurisdiction of the competent
Iranian courts." Claims Declaration, supra note 1, art. II, 1, at 231. Many contracts of
American claimants provided in one form or another for the resolution of legal disputes in
Iran. The effect of such forum exclusion clauses was resolved on Nov. 9, 1982, when the
Tribunal decided nine cases chosen as representative of the cases. See IRANIAN ASSETS LITI-
GATION REP. (Andrews) 5618-84 (Nov. 19, 1982).
American claimants have filed more than 1,000 claims with the Tribunal. An additional
2,795 claims of under $250,000 were filed by the United States government on behalf of
American claimants. Iran has filed approximately 1,100 claims with the Tribunal. IRANIAN
ASSETS LITIGATION REP. 4238 (Andrews) (Feb. 19, 1982). There has been considerable con-
flict among Tribunal members-one Iranian member has resigned and the Iranians have
called for the resignation of Justice Mangard of Sweden for alleged anti-Iranian bias. Id at
4234-35 (Feb. 19, 1982).
39 Exec. Order Nos. 12,276-12,285, 3 C.F.R. 104-118 (1982). These executive orders
were not effective until the Algerian government certified that the hostages had safely de-
parted from Iran. The hostages, however, were not released until 12:35 p.m. Eastern Stan-
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tachment of the frozen assets, nullified non-Iranian rights in the assets
acquired under the license, precluded persons subject to United States
jurisdiction from acquiring further interests in the blocked assets, and
required banks holding Iranian funds to transfer them to the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York for disposition according to the Treasury
Secretary's instructions.40
President Reagan ratified the agreement on February 24, 1981, and
issued an executive order "suspending" all claims in other forums that
were eligible for resolution by the Claims Tribunal.41 The order pro-
vided that "[d]uring the period of this suspension, all such claims shall
have no legal effect in any action now pending in any court of the
United States . .. )42
III
DAMES & MooRE v REGAN
By January 20, 1979, when President Carter agreed to terminate
legal proceedings against Iran and to nullify attachments obtained in
such proceedings, at least 450 actions were pending in United States
courts. 43 The case that ultimately provided the Supreme Court with the
opportunity to review the President's actions was a typical claim-an
American company's breach of contract action against the government
of Iran, filed after the President's order blocking Iranian assets and
before his agreement to terminate legal proceedings.
In December 1979, the petitioner, Dames & Moore, had filed suit in
the United States District Court for the Central District of California
against the government of Iran, the Atomic Energy Organization of
Iran (AEOI), and a number of Iranian banks. The petitioner alleged
that its wholly-owned subsidiary, Dames & Moore International, had
contracted with the AEOI to conduct site studies for a proposed nuclear
power plant in Iran, and that AEOI owed the corporation $3.4 million
plus interest for services performed prior to termination of the contract.
dard Time on Jan. 20, just minutes after Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency. These
unusual events led one court to grant a preliminary injunction because "there is a substantial
likelihood that the Executive Order was not validly promulgated during President Carter's
term ofoffice." Electronic Data Sys. Corp. Iran v. Social Sec. Org. of Iran, 508 F. Supp. 1350,
1359 (N.D. Tex.), vacated in part, 651 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1981). This issue was subsequently
mooted, however, by President Reagan's ratification of the orders. See infra notes 41-42 and
accompanying text.
40 Exec. Order Nos. 12,276-12,285, 3 C.F.R. 104-18 (1982).
41 Exec. Order No. 12,294, 3 C.F.R. 139 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Suspension Order].
42 Id The Suspension Order provides that the suspension of a claim terminates if the
Tribunal determines it is without jurisdiction over the claim, in which case the claim may
again be litigated in United States courts. If the Tribunal either rejects the claim on the
merits or issues an award that is fully discharged, its action "shall operate as a final resolution
and discharge of the claim for all purposes." Id




To secure any potential judgment, Dames & Moore attached Iranian
bank accounts in the United States and obtained orders of attachment
directed against the defendants' property.
One month after the United States signed the Algerian Declara-
tions, the district court granted Dames & Moore's motion for summary
judgment. 44 Dames & Moore then attempted to execute its judgment
against Iranian property by obtaining writs of garnishment and execu-
tion in state courts. The district court, however, by an order dated May
28, 1981, stayed execution of its judgment pending appeal by the de-
fendants. The district court also vacated all prejudgment attachments
against the defendants and ordered that further proceedings be stayed
pursuant to the executive orders.45
The petitioner then sued the United States and the Secretary of the
Treasury for declaratory and injunctive relief. It sought to enjoin the
enforcement of the executive orders and the Treasury regulations, alleg-
ing that the enactments were unauthorized by statute and were uncon-
stitutional. The district court dismissed the petitioner's complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted on May 28,
1981. The petitioner appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on
June 3, 1981, while simultaneously petitioning the Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari before judgment. The Court granted certiorari on
June 11, 1981.46 Because of the July 19, 1981, deadline for transferring
property to Iran,47 the Court adopted an expedited briefing schedule
and set oral argument for June 24, 1981. 4 8
Less than one month after granting certiorari, and just eight days
after oral argument, the Supreme Court in Dames & Moore v. Regan49
upheld the authority of the President by executive agreement alone to
suspend legal proceedings instituted in United States courts by Ameri-
can plaintiffs, to nullify attachments obtained in such proceedings, and
to cause the transfer back to Iran of Iranian assets in the United States,
including assets previously subject to attachment. 50 The decision, writ-
44 Dames & Moore v. Atomic Energy Org. of Iran, No. 79-04918 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
45 Dames &Moore, 453 U.S. at 666.
46 452 U.S. 932 (1981).
47 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
48 452 U.S. at 933.
49 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
50 The lower courts had ruled inconsistently on the President's authority to enter into
and implement the agreements. The two courts of appeals that had ruled on the issue, how-
ever, had upheld the President's actions. Compare American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Re-
public of Iran, 657 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1981) and Chas. T. Main Int'l Inc. v. Khuzestan Water
& Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800 (Ist Cir. 1981) with Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp.,
518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 657 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1981) and Electronic Data Sys. Corp.
Iran v. Social Sec. Org. of Iran, 508 F. Supp. 1350 (N.D. Tex.), vacated in part, 651 F.2d 1007
(5th Cir. 1981).
The Court also held that although the nullification of attachments did not constitute a
"taking," the Court of Claims had jurisdiction to hear allegations that the President's suspen-
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ten by Justice Rehnquist, was unanimous.
A. Nullification of Attachments and Transfer of Assets
The Court first addressed the President's authority to nullify at-
tachments obtained by American litigants against Iranian property in
the United States and to require the transfer of Iranian assets to Iran.
Adopting the reasoning of the District of Columbia and First Circuit
Courts of Appeals, 5' the Court found that the "plain language" of
IEEPA specifically authorized the President's actions.52 The relevant
provision of IEEPA authorizes the President to
investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or pro-
hibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal,
transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercis-
ing any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions in-
volving, any property in which -any foreign country or a national
thereof has any interest . . . by any person, or with respect to any
property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 53
The Court rejected the argument that the legislative history of the
IEEPA, and of its predecessor, section 5(b)(1) of the TWEA,54 demon-
strates that the IEEPA was not intended to give the President the exten-
sive power over the assets of a foreign state that he had exercised:
We do not agree and refuse to read out of § 1702 all meaning to the
words "transfer", "compel", or "nullify". Nothing in the legislative
history of either § 1702 or § 5(b) or the TWEA requires such a result
... . Although Congress intended to limit the President's emer-
gency power in peacetime, we do not think the changes brought about
by the enactment of the IEEPA in any way affected the authority of
the President to take the specific actions taken here.55
sion of claims was a compensable "taking" under the fifth amendment. 453 U.S. at 689-90.
Justice Stevens concurred in part, stating that the possibility of a taking was so remote that
the Court need not have addressed this jurisdictional question. Id at 690 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring). Justice Powell dissented from the Court's determination that the President's nullifica-
tion of attachments did not constitute a compensable taking of property and added that any
losses caused by the President's suspension of claims should be compensable. Id at 690-91
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a discussion of the Court's treat-
ment of the fifth amendment taking issue, see generally Note, Dames & Moore v. Regan-
Rights in Conjfctl: The Ffth Amendment Held Hostage, 31 AM. U.L. REv. 345 (1982).
51 See, e.g., American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430, 439-40
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800,
806 (Ist Cir. 1981).
52 See, e.g., 453 U.S. at 669-74.
53 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
54 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). For a discussion of the relationship
between the IEEPA and § 5(b)(1) of the TWEA, see generally infia notes 62-75 and accompa-
nying text.
55 453 U.S. at 672-73.
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1. The Transfer of Assets
The Court rejected in a footnote the contention that, by denying
the President the power under the IEEPA to "vest" foreign-owned assets
during a national emergency, Congress intended to permit him to
"freeze" assets but not to dispose of them permanently. "[T]he plain
language of the statute," the Court said, "defies such a holding."56
On their face, the words on which the Court relied-"transfer,"
"compel," "nullify"-appear to authorize the President to nullify at-
tachments and order the transfer of foreign assets to their host country.
As the Court itself has admonished, however, if statutory interpretation
properly begins with "plain language," it does not end there. The Court
has recognized that it "has some 'scope for adopting a restricted rather
than a literal or usual meaning of [a statute's] words where acceptance
of that meaning would lead to absurd results. . . or would thwart the
obvious purpose of the statute' . . .,57
A literal reading of the IEEPA and the TWEA is particularly inap-
propriate, for the Supreme Court has characterized the TWEA as
"hasty legislation which Congress did not stop to perfect as an inte-
grated whole,"58 and as "a makeshift patchwork." 59 Moreover, the
Court has cautioned that the piecemeal nature of the TWEA "strongly
counsels against literalness of application. It favors a wise latitude of
construction in enforcing its purposes." 6° As a result, the Court has rec-
ognized in another case interpreting the TWEA that "[t]he process of
interpretation . . . misses its high function if a strict reading of a law
results in the emasculation. . . of a provision which a less literal read-
ing would preserve." 61
Tracing the history of the IEEPA highlights the significance of the
omission of a "vesting" power from its provisions. Section 1702 of the
IEEPA grew out of the TWEA. Before Congress enacted the IEEPA in
1971, the TWEA granted expansive powers62 to the President at war-
56 Id at 672 n.5.
57 In re Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 643 (1978) (quoting Commis-
sioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965)); see also Phillbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 714
(1975) ("[A] thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute,
because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.' (quoting Church of
Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)); Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest
Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1 (1976) (recognizing relevance of statute's legislative history
to construing meaning even of unambiguous words); Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The
'Plain-Meaning Rule" and Stalutoo, Interpretation in the "Mooern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L.
REv. 1299 (1975).
58 Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., 332 U.S. 480, 488 (1947).
59 Guessefeldt v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 308, 319 (1952).
60 Id (citations omitted).
61 Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404, 409 (1945).
62 Section 5(b)(1) of the TWEA provided that:
During the time of war or during any other period of national emergency
declared by the President, the President may, through any agency that he
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time and "during any other period of national emergency declared by
the President. '63 Among the enumerated powers, the Act specifically
permitted the President to "vest [any property in which any foreign
country or a national thereof has any interest] in such agency or person
as may be designated. . . by the President. '64 The agency or person so
vested could then dispose of the property "in the interest of and for the
benefit of the United States. '65
Congress enacted the IEEPA in 1977 specifically to limit the broad
emergency powers previously exercisable by the President under the
TWEA. Noting that the TWEA had "become essentially an unlimited
grant of authority for the President to exercise, at his discretion, broad
powers in both the domestic and international economic arena, without
congressional review," 66 Congress repealed all peacetime powers from
TWEA section 5(b) (1).67 The new act, the IEEPA, addressed national
emergencies during peacetime and represented a "new set of interna-
tional .economic powers, more restricted than those available during
time of war."6s
In fact, section 1702(a) (1) (B) of the IEEPA, which grants the new
set of powers, is in many respects identical to its predecessor, section
5(b)(1) of the TWEA;69 indeed, the one notable change in the enumer-
ated powers is that the IEEPA removed from presidential authority the
may designate, or otherwise, and under such rules and regulations as he may
prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise -....
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or pro-
hibit, any acquisition holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, trans-
portation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right,
power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in
which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest, by any per-
son, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States; and any property or interest of any foreign country or national thereof
shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms, directed by the President, in such
agency or person as may be designated from time to time by the President,
and upon such terms and conditions as the President may prescribe such in-
terest or property shall be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or other-
wise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States, and
such designated agency or person may perform any and all acts incident to
the accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes ...
First War Powers Act, Ch. 593, § 301(1), 55 Stat. 838, 839-40 (1941) (current version at 50




66 H.R. REP. No. 459, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977) [hereinafter cited as IEEPA HousE
REPORT].
67 Trading With the Enemy Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101(a), 91 Stat.
1625 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
68 IEEPA HOUSE REPORT, supra note 66, at 10.
69 The "new set of international powers" does not so much change the powers given the
President as it tightens the definition and limits the duration of a declared national emer-
gency. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701(b), 1706(b) (Supp. III 1979).
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power to "vest" foreign property. 70 Furthermore, Congress had earlier
demonstrated that it recognized the distinction between the vesting
power and other, less permanent powers of property disposition. The
original 1917 version of the TWEA did not grant the President the
power to vest foreign assets. Congress added the vesting provision in
1941, because the 1917 Act failed to give the President "the broad pow-
ers to take, administer, control, use, liquidate, etc. such foreign-owned
property that would be given by [section 5(b)(1)]."'7 Prior to the addi-
tion of the power to vest, Congress noted that the TWEA was "a system
which [could] prevent transactions in foreign property prejudicial to the
best interests of the United States, but it [was] not a system which
[could] affirmatively compel the use and application of foreign property
in those interests. ' 72 Because section 1702(a) (1) (B) restores the pre-1941
language of section 5(b) in the national-emergency context, the scope of
the early TWEA provides insight into the proper scope of section
1702(a)(1)(B). The legislative history of the original version of section
5(b) indicates that, notwithstanding its apparent breadth, the power
granted by that language was the power to freeze temporarily foreign
assets, and not, as was found in Dames & Moore, the power to dispose
permanently of them.
As the Court read the IEEPA, the President may permanently dis-
pose of foreign assets in which United States claimants have an interest
in any way he chooses, as long as he does not formally vest them. Thus,
under the Court's reasoning, the President may transfer such assets out
of the United States and beyond the jurisdiction of its courts, even
though the practical result is the extinction of the rights of domestic
claimants. Such a "transfer" is in substance, if not in form, a "vesting"
of assets. It is unlikely that Congress, having stripped the President of
peacetime authority to vest in the belief that such power was excessive,
intended nonetheless to leave him with the power to effect a de facto
70 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1) (1976),amendedby 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV
1980).
71 H.R. REP. No. 1507, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 2-3 (1941).
72 Id As Representative Gwynne explained during the House debate on the 1941
amendment, "the principal difference between [the amended] law and the one we had during
the last war [is that] the President may hold and use--that is the new part-or sell such
property for the benefit of the United States." 87 CONG. REC. 9862 (1941), quoted in Tagle v.
Regan, 643 F.2d 1058, 1066 (5th Cir. 1981); accord Markham v. Cabell, 325 U.S. 404, 411
(1945); Bishop,Judicial Construction of the Trading with the Enemy At, 62 HARV. L. REv. 721,
721-23 (1949) (contrasting the essentially defensive freezing power, which "keep[s] an enemy
from using for his own purposes any property which he owns or controls, located within the
United States," with the power to vest, which makes that same property available for the
purposes of the United States); Littaver, The Unleezing of Forezn Funds, 45 COLUM. L.J. 132,
133 (1945) ("Freezing is employed where it is considered sufficient merely to prevent a use of
the property by the owner in a manner detrimental to American interests. Vesting is applied
where positive use or direct management of the property by the American government is
considered desirable.") (footnote omitted).
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vesting through the transfer of assets to a foreign sovereign.73
The Court's broad interpretation of the President's power under
the IEEPA to transfer permanently assets also denies adequate protec-
tion to American claimants with interests in those assets. The TWEA
complements the President's "vesting" power with a claims procedure to
protect American creditors of foreign debtors whose assets are seized or
vested. 74 In contrast, the Court's interpretation of the IEEPA allows the
President to transfer assets without any statutory safeguards for Ameri-
can creditors. The Court, therefore, allowed the use of the transfer
power in contravention of one of the primary objectives of the vesting
power under the TWEA: the use of enemy property within the United
States to satisfy the claims of United States citizens. 75 Moreover, the
Court's interpretation of section 1702 leads to the anomalous result that
if the President "vests" foreign property during wartime under the
TWEA, he must distribute it to American claimants pursuant to a statu-
tory claims procedure, but he may "transfer" that same property back
to the foreign debtor free and clear under his supposedly more restric-
tive IEEPA peacetime powers.
2. The Nullification of Attachments
The Court also faced the question of the President's power to nul-
lify attachment liens. The Court held that the attachments were prop-
erly nullified because they were subject to a revocable license 76 and,
because the liens were subject to nullification, they created no property
interest in their holders that could give rise to a compensable "taking"
under the due process clause.77 The Court furnished no support for
these contentions. Instead, it cited a series of distinguishable "vesting"
cases as support for this broad grant of presidential powers: Orvis v.
Brownell 78 Zitman v. McGrath, 79 and Propper v. Clark. 8 0
The Court cited Orris as support for the proposition that "an Amer-
ican claimant may not use an attachment that is subject to a revocable
73 See also Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Iran, 513 F. Supp. 864 (C.D. Cal. 1981); McNulty,
Constitutionality ofAlien Property Controls, 11 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 139 (1945). But see
Unidyne Corp. v. Iran, 512 F. Supp. 705 (E.D. Va. 1981).
74 Section 34(a) provides that "[any property or interest vested in or transferred to the
Alien Property Custodian. . .shall be equitably applied by the Custodian. . .to the pay-
ment of debts owned [sic] by the persons who owned such property or interest immediately
prior to its vesting in or transfer. . . ." 50 U.S.C. app. § 34(a) (1976).
75 See H.R. REP. No. 85, 65th Cong., Ist Sess. 1, 4 (1917). As stated in Zittman v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 471, 474 (1951), the power to vest "is not a confiscation measure, but a
liquidation measure for the protection of American creditors."
76 453 U.S. at 672-73 nn. 5 & 6.
77 Id at 673 n.6.
78 345 U.S. 183 (1953).
79 341 U.S. 446 (1951).
80 337 U.S. 472 (1949).
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license and that has been obtained after the entry of a freeze order to
limit in any way the actions the President may take under section 1702
respecting the frozen assets." 8' In Orvis, the President had issued a
freeze order regarding Japanese assets. The petitioners, American
claimants, subsequently brought suit against Japanese nationals and,
without obtaining a license, attached a debt owed by an American com-
pany to the Japanese defendants. Shortly thereafter, the Custodian
vested the assets in question under the authority of the TWEA.82 The
petitioners brought suit against the Custodian, challenging his power to
annul the attachment. They claimed that he could not vest property in
which they had acquired an interest and, therefore, they were entitled
to a return of the assets rather than a smaller share of the assets by
equitable distribution.83 The Court held that the petitioner's attach-
ment, although valid under New York law, was subordinate to the fed-
eral freezing order and the President's vesting of the assets.
The facts of Orvis bears little resemblance to Dames &Moore. First,
Oris presented a challenge to the use of the TWEA vesting power to
override attachments; in Dames & Moore, the President had no power to
vest the assets. Second, Orris involved an attachment made without a
license during an executive freeze on the transfer of foreign assets. In
Dames & Moore, the Treasury Department had specifically licensed pre-
judgment attachments of Iranian assets. 84 Third, and most important,
Orris did not involve a dispute over a presidential order that tranferred
the assets back to the foreign debtor; instead, the case held only that the
interest of the domestic claimant was subordinate to that of the Alien
Property Custodian, an interest that would ultimately be used to ensure
equitable distribution of the assets under the TWEA claims procedure
for the benefit of all United States claimants. 85 Thus, unlike Dames &
Moore, the respective rights of a domestic claimant and the enemy
debtor were not at issue in Oris.
The Court summarily concluded that Ziman v. McGrath8 6 did not
require a contrary result.8 7 Zittman, however, squarely rejected the very
power that the Court approved in Dames &Moore. In Zittman, domestic
claimants attached "frozen" German assets located in American banks.
Pursuant to an executive order vesting the assets, the Alien Property
Custodian sought a ruling that the attachments were void not only
against the power to vest, but also against the German debtor.8 8 The
81 Dames &AMoore, 453 U.S. at 672 n.5 (emphasis in original).
82 Or4, 345 U.S. at 185.
83 Id at 184-85; see supra note 76 and accompanying text.
84 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
85 345 U.S. at 186-87; see supra note 75.
86 341 U.S. 446 (1951).
87 See Dames &Moore 453 U.S. at 672 n.5.
88 "[The Custodian] takes the position that no valid rights against the German debtors
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Court held that, although the attachments were subordinate to the Cus-
todian's power to vest, they remained valid against property interests
retained by the foreign debtors: "As against the German debtors, the
attachments and the judgments they secure are valid under New York
law, and cannot be cancelled or annulled under a Vesting Order by
which the Custodian takes over only the right, title, and interest of those
debtors in the accounts. '8 9
As final support for the President's nullification of liens and attach-
ments, the Court quoted an assertion in Propper v. Clark that the purpose
of blocking orders is "to put control of foreign assets in the hands of the
President." 9° Propper makes clear, however, that such assets are in the
hands of the President to secure their benefit for United States claim-
ants, not to allow their transfer to an enemy debtor beyond the reach of
American creditors. 9 ' Again, a case cited by the Court for support ar-
guably contradicts its upholding of the President's power to transfer as-
sets directly to a foreign debtor and nullify prejudgment attachments. 92
were acquired by the attachments because prohibited by the freezing program." 341 U.S. at
463.
89 Id at 463-64.
90 337 U.S. 472, 493 (1949).
91 "Through the Trading with the Enemy Act, in its various forms, the nation sought to
deprive enemies, actual or potential, of the opportunity to secure advantages to themselves or
to perpetrate wrongs against the United States or its citizens through the use of assets that
happened to be in this country." Id at 481. The assets are held "to compensate our citizens
or ourselves for the damages done by the governments of the nationals affected." Id at 484.
92 Accord Electronic Data Sys. Corp. Iran v. Social Sec. Org. of Iran, 508 F. Supp. 1350,
1361 (N.D. Tex.) ("In essence, [Ex. Order No. 11,279] directs that the funds in which Iran has
an interest be transferred to the control of Executive Branch and attempts to vest custody and
control of the assets in the Executive. This is a power which Congress declined to grant to the
President with the enactment of IEEPA in 1977."), reo'd in part, 651 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1981)
(court cites Dames &Moore in allowing President to suspend claims); Note, Dames & Moore v.
Regan: The Iranian Settlement Agreements, Supreme Court Acquiescence to Broad Presidential DiLcretion,
31 OATH. U.L. Rsv. 565, 585-86 (1982); Comment, The Settlement Claims Case: Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 577, 582 (1981) ("The President's 'transfer'
order seeks to dispose of Iranian assets by permanently divesting American creditors of their
statutory rights. Once such a transfer occurs, the freeze order no longer retains the character
of a temporary measure, but rather becomes a permanent vesting order."). But see Note, The
Iranian Hostage Agreement Under International and United States Law, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 822, 848
(1981) (arguing that IEEPA authorized the nullification of Dames & Moore's attachments).
The Court categorized Dames & Moore's interest in its attachments as "contingent" and
"revocable," and held that "the attachments obtained by petitioner were specifically made
subordinate to further actions which the President might take under the IEEPA." 453 U.S.
at 673. The Court accurately stated that the "Treasury Regulations provided that 'unless
licensed' any attachment is null and void, 31 C.F.R. § 535.203(e) (1980), and all licenses 'may
be amended, modified, or revoked at any time.' § 535.805." 453 U.S. at 673. In contrast to
its literal reading of the powers apparently conferred by the IEEPA, however, the Court
selectively ignored the "plain language" of these regulations, which suggests that only the
license, and not the attachments themselves, were revocable. Id at 674 n.6. President Carter's
statement to Congress, released concurrently with the initial Freeze Regulation, reinforces the
"plain language" interpretation: The freeze "will enable the United States to assure that
these resources will be available to satisfy lawful claims of citizens and entities of the United
States against the Government of Iran." President's Message to Congress (Nov. 14, 1979), reprinted
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The Court's willingness to uphold nullification of the attachments
may have been due in part to an unvoiced skepticism that the attach-
ments on Iranian property were valid in the first place. Orvis and
Zittman involved attachments of private property, not property belong-
ing to a foreign sovereign. Prejudgment attachment of property belong-
ing to a foreign state is authorized only when the foreign state has
explicitly waived its immunity therefrom.9 3 Neither the Supreme Court
nor any court of appeals has ruled on whether the Iran-U.S. Treaty of
Amity94 constitutes an "explicit waiver," but the only district courts to
rule on the issue have held that it does not.9 5 Under these circum-
stances, the Court may have felt that the prejudgment attachment of
assets belonging to the Iranian sovereign would be nullified by the
courts in any event. Nonetheless, attachments are presumptively valid
until vacated, and nothing in the Court's reasoning serves analytically to
distinguish prejudgment attachments of private property from those of
property belonging to a foreign sovereign.
B. Suspension of Claims
1. The Theoy of Delegation by Acquiescence
Under traditional notions of separation of powers, the President's
exercise of power must find support either in the plenary powers granted
by the Constitution or in a statutory delegation from Congress.9 6 In
in IRANIAN AssErs LrGATION REP. (Andrews) 140 (Feb. 8, 1980). Until the signing of the
Algerian declarations, the question of license revocation had not come before the courts. In a
somewhat analogous TWEA case, Brownell v. National City Bank, 131 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y.
1955), one district court held that a license permitting set-offs could not be revoked by the
United States so as to require a set-off to be undone. Brownell is unreliable precedent, how-
ever, because the court suggested an intent to limit its holding to set-offs and the unique facts
of that case. The set-off money in that case had been disbursed by the licensee, in part, to
third parties. The Court analogized the case to an attempt to revoke a license permitting a
building to be demolished after the building had been destroyed. Id at 63.
93 See supra note 28.
94 Treaty of Amity, Aug. 15, 1955, United States-Iran, art. III, § 2, 8 U.S.T. 901, 902,
T.I.A.S. No. 3853.
95 See, e.g., New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmis-
sion Co., 502 F. Supp. 120, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air
Force, 475 F. Supp. 383, 393 (D.N.J. 1979).
96 "The President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of
Congress or from the Constitution itself." Youngstown Sheet & Tool Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 585 (1952). The Court in Damers &Moore quoted this statement from the classic case in
which the Court invalidated President Truman's seizure of the nation's steel mills. 453 U.S.
at 668. The Court also recognized as analytically useful, if somewhat simplified, the frame-
work that Justice Jackson set out in his Youngstown concurrence for assessing the power of the
President to act in a given case. First, according to Justice Jackson, when the President acts
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, he exercises his inherent powers
plus those delegated to him from Congress, placing his authority "at its maximum." 343 U.S.
at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). Second, when the President acts in the absence of a congres-
sional grant or denial of authority, he may rely only on his inherent constitutional powers. A
"zone of twilight," however, may exist in this setting if he and Congress have concurrent
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Dames & Moore, the Court rejected the government's contention that
Congress had delegated to the President the power to suspend claims
under the IEEPA97 or the so-called "Hostage Act," 98 and it refused to
find that the President possesses plenary power to settle claims.9 9 The
authority, or if the distribution of power is uncertain. Id at 637. In the "zone of twilight,"
congressional inertia may "enable, if not invite," the exercise of presidential power. Id Fi-
nally, the President's power is at its "lowest ebb" when he acts contrary to the will of Con-
gress; he then may rely only on his exclusive constitutional powers minus the constitutional
powers granted to him and Congress concurrently. Id
97 453 U.S. at 675. The Court determined that American claimants' inpersonam lawsuits
against Iran were not "transactions involving .. .property" within the meaning of the
IEEPA, and that the IEEPA, therefore, did not expressly confer the power to suspend such
claims. Id; accord American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430, 443
n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Chas. T. Main, Int'l Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d
800, 809 n.13 (Ist Cir. 1981); Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69, 79
(S.D.N.Y.), vacated in part, 657 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1981).
98 The Hostage Act, enacted in 1868, states:
Whenever it is made known to the President that any citizen of the
United States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the au-
thority of any foreign government, it shall be the duty of the President forth-
with to demand of that government the reasons of such imprisonment; and if
it appears to be wrongful and in violation of the rights of American citizen-
ship, the President shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen, and if
the release so demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused, the President
shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary
and proper to obtain or effectuate the release; and all the facts and proceed-
ings relative thereto shall as soon as practicable be communicated by the
President to Congress.
22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976). Despite the Act's broad language, the Court concluded that the
Act's legislative history indicated its inapplicability to the Iranian situation. 453 U.S. at 676-
77; accord Mikva & Neuman, The Hostage Crisis and the "Hostage Act," 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 292
(1982).
99 "We do not decide that the President possesses plenary power to settle claims, even as
against foreign governmental entities." 453 U.S. at 688. The United States had argued stren-
uously that the President has broad inherent power to settle the claims of American nationals
against foreign governments. See Brief for United States at 17, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654 (1981) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Brief] ("The President has authority under the
Constitution to settle outstanding international claims of American nationals."); see atso State-
ment of Interest of the United States, New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iowa Power
Generation & Transmission Co., 502 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) [hereinafter cited as U.S.
Statement of Interest] ("The President under Article II of the Constitution possesses plenary
power to enter into agreements for settlement of claims with foreign nations.'), rev'd and va-
cated, 657 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1981). During oral arguments before the Supreme Court, Solicitor
General Rex Lee went a step further and stated that the Court's refusal to recognize such a
power would "be in derogation of sovereignty itself." IRANIAN AssETs LITIGATION REP. (An-
drews) 3334 (July 3, 1981).
The Court's refusal to adopt the government's assertion of an inherent presidential
power to settle claims, together with its reading of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), may indicate an implied rejection, or at least a healthy skepti-
cism, toward such a power. Underlying the Government's asserted inherent power to settle
claims was the notion, first enunciated in Justice Sutherland's famous dictum in Curtiss-
Wright, id at 320, that the President is the "sole organ of federal government in the field of
international relations." Justice Sutherland's discussion of the President's foreign affairs pow-
ers, id at 319-20, was only dictum in that the sole issue in Curtiss-Wright was the legality of a
congressional delegation of authority to the President. The case "involved, not the question
of the President's power to act without congressional authority, but the question of his right
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Court nevertheless upheld the President's suspension of American claims
against Iran, relying on an alleged acquiescence of Congress in the Presi-
dent's actions. The Court cited three cases in support of its theory that
congressional acquiescence constitutes delegation of power to the
President.
First, the Court cited Justice Frankfurter's statement in his Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer concurrence that "'a systematic, unbro-
ken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress
and never before questioned. . . may be treated as a gloss on 'Executive
Power' vested in the President by § 1 of Art. IV "100 Because Justice
Frankfurter joined the full Court in rejecting President Truman's
seizure of United States mills during peacetime, the quoted passage is
dictum. Even if the passage was central to Justice Frankfurter's concur-
rence, no other member of the Court joined his opinion. In any case, the
passage is inapposite given the express refusal in Dames & Moore to find
any such inherent Article II power vested in the President.' 0 ' The pas-
sage is thus irrelevant to any inquiry into the delegated, as opposed to
plenary, sources of presidential power. 0 2
Next, the Court cited the 1915 case of United States v. Midwest Oil
Co. 103 and the recent decision in Haig v. Agee 1 o4to support the proposi-
tion that "[p]ast practice does not, by itself, create power, but 'long-
continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would
to act under and in accord with an Act of Congress." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 n.2 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Bickel, Congress, the
President and the Power to Wage War, 48 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 131, 137 (1971) (discussion of
better legislative delegation). More fundamentally, Sutherland's claim that the President
possesses plenary and exclusive foreign affairs power has been sharply criticized as without
historical foundation. See, e.g., Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 45-48 (1972); Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analsis of Mr. Justice Sutherland s
Theo.7
, 
55 YALE L.J. 467, 488 (1946).
The Court in Dames &Moore contrasted Justice Sutherland's "sole organ" formulation in
Curtiss-Wight with Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown. The Court characterized
Jackson's opinion as "bring[ing] together as much combination of analysis and common sense
as there is in this area," and specifically noted that Youngstown focused not on the "plenary
and exclusive power of the President" but rather responded to a claim of virtually unlimited
powers for the Executive by noting:
The example of such unlimited executive power that must have most im-
pressed the forefathers was the prerogative exercised by George III, and the
description of its evils in the Declaration of Independence leads me to doubt
that they were creating their new Executive in his image.
453 U:S. at 661-62 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
100 453 U.S. at 686 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
101 See 453 U.S. at 688.
102 See also Comment, Presidential Powers in Foreign Relations: Dames & Moore v. Regan, 95
HAPuv. L. REv. 191, 195-96 (1981).
103 236 U.S. 459 (1913).
104 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
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raise a presumption that the [action] had been [taken] in pursuance of
its consent .... ' "105 In Midwest Oil, the Court upheld the President's
power to withdraw, in the public interest, public lands that Congress
had previously opened to private acquisition. Legislative acquiescence
to the President's action was manifest in Midwest Oil-American presi-
dents had made "[s]cores and hundreds"'10 6 of these withdrawal orders
throughout American history.10 7
Midwest Oil, however, does not support the proposition that con-
gressional acquiescence alone constitutes delegation of power to the
President. The full passage from Midwest Oil that Dames & Moore cites
in part states "that the long-continued practice, known to and acqui-
esced in by Congress, would raise a presumption that the withdrawals
had been made in pursuance of its consent or of a recognized administrative
power of the Executive in the management of the public lands. "108 These excised
words were critical to the holding in Midwest Oil. The presumption that
the President has power to withdraw land within the public domain was
deemed particularly appropriate in that case because "the land laws are
not of a legislative character in the highest sense of the term (Art. 4, § 3),
'but savor somewhat of mere rules prescribed by an owner of property
for its disposal.'"109 "[I]t must be borne in mind," the Midwest Oil
Court continued, "that Congress not only has a legislative power over
the public domain, but it also exercises the powers of the proprietor
therein." 110  The legislative acquiescence in Midwest Oil therefore vali-
dated an exercise of presidential power unique to land laws: the Presi-
dent's administrative power to execute "as agent" the proprietary
powers of Congress over public lands."'
Moreover, congressional acquiescence in the President's actions in
Midwest Oil cannot be questioned. Seven years before the order chal-
lenged in Midwest Oil, the Senate had requested and received a report
from the Secretary of the Interior detailing the President's longstanding
practice of land withdrawal." 2 Congress further demonstrated its ac-
105 453 U.S. at 686 (quoting United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459,474 (1915)).
106 United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 469 (1915).
107 236 U.S. at 469.
108 Id at 474 (emphasis added).
109 Id (citation omitted) (quoting Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119, 126
(1905)); see also Kieppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976) ("Congress exercises the
powers both of a proprietor and of a legislature over the public domain." (citing United
States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915)).
110 236 U.S. at 474.
111 The Supreme Court had never before used Midwest Oil to support an exercise of presi-
dential power independent of delegated authority; the Court had previously cited the case
only in land cases and in discussion of the scope of presidential power under an express dele-
gation from Congress. See, e.g., Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974); NLRB v. Bell Aero-
space Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11 (1965); United States v.
Jackson, 280 U.S. 183, 197 (1934); see also Comment, supra note 102, at 195.
112 236 U.S. 459, 480-81 (1915).
[Vol. 68:68
PRESIDENTIAL POWER
quiescence in the practice shortly after the withdrawal at issue in Mid-
west Oil by prospectively authorizing such withdrawals by the
President.' 13 According to the Court in Midwest Oil, Congress expressed
not "the slightest intent to repudiate the withdrawals already made
"114
The Court's reliance on Haig v. Agee 115 is equally misplaced. Haig
upheld a regulation granting the Secretary of State broad discretion to
revoke United States passports on national security and foreign policy
grounds. At issue was the scope of executive power under an express
congressional delegation of power to regulate the issuance of pass-
ports."16 In contrast, the Court in Dames &Moore specifically held that




The Court in Dames & Moore not only failed to find precedential
support for its theory of delegation by congressional acquiescence, but
also mischaracterized the "history of congressional acquiescence"'"1 8 in
the settlement by executive agreement of private claims against foreign
governments. In justifying the delegation theory, the Court relied upon
a "longstanding practice" of executive claims settlements dating as far
back as 1799.119 Although American presidents have made many settle-
ments in the past, 120 the entire history recited by the Court up to 1952 is
irrelevant to the propriety of settling enforceable commercial claims of
American citizens pending in United States courts against foreign gov-
ernments. Before 1952, the United States adhered to the doctrine of
absolute sovereign immunity, 121 which denied state and federal courts
113 Act ofJune 25, 1910, ch. 421, 36 Stat. 847 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 141), repealed by Act
of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704, 90 Stat. 2743, 2792.
114 236 U.S. at 482.
115 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
116 The Passport Act of 1926, 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1976). The Court has long recognized
that congressional acquiescence to an "interpretation expressly placed on a statute by those
charged with its administration must be given weight by courts faced with the task of constru-
ing the statute." Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. at 11. The acquiescence in Haig, however, involved
a long-standing executive construction of the Act. The dissent in Haig persuasively argued that
Zemd requires that an administrative practice be shown. 453 U.S. at 314 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
Haig has been sharply criticized for its excessive deference to the executive branch, par-
ticularly in an area that implicates the constitutionally-protected right to travel. See, e.g.,
Kamisar, The Agee Decision, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1981, at A15, col. 1; Comment, The Right to
TraveL" Haig v. Agee, 95 HARv. L. REV. 201 (1981); Comment, Authori!y of Secretay of State to
Revoke Passports for National Security or Foreign Policy Reasons: Haig v. Agee, 66 MINN. L. REv.
667 (1982).
117 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
118 453 U.S. at 678-79.
119 Id at 679.
120 See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 262-66 (1972).
121 Foreign nations traditionally enjoyed absolute immunity from suit in United States
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jurisdiction over suits against foreign governments. A United States citi-
zen with a grievance against a foreign government had no remedy unless
the President chose to pursue the claim diplomatically-"espouse" it-
and seek a settlement. 22 The President had wide discretion: he could
not be compelled to espouse a claim, and he could settle for any
amount. 123
The Court conceded that this argument is "not wholly without
merit,"' 24 but rejected the argument nonetheless. In so doing, the Court
failed to recognize that the pre-1952 history of claims settlement offered
no support whatsoever to the exercise of presidential power in Dames &
Moore. The issue raised in Dames & Moore was whether the President
could force a plaintiff with a cognizable claim pending against a sover-
eign government to accept an alternative forum. That issue could not
have arisen until 1952, when suits against foreign governments were first
permitted in limited circumstances. 25 And it could not have been
courts. E.g., Schooner Exch. v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). Courts followed
strictly State Department suggestions of immunity for foreign nation defendants. See, e.g., Ex
pare Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943).
122 The very authority that the Court cites for the longstanding practice of executive
claim settlements, Lillich, The Gravel Amendment to the Trade Reform Act of 1974 Congress
Checkmates a Presidential Lump Sum Agreement, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 837 (1975), citedwith approval in
Dames &Moore, 453 U.S. at 679 n.8, illustrates the dissimilar positions of past claimants and
the petitioners in Dames & Moore: "[T]he principal beneficiaries of the settlement agree-
ments-U.S. claimants-unfortunately are looked upon more as charitable cases than as per-
sons deprived of valuable rights and hence legally entitled to just compensation." Id. at 846;
accord I. LILLICH & B. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP
SUM AGREEMENTS 10 (1975) ("Absent a diplomatic initiative on the part of the private
claimant's government, generally these claims have gone begging.").
123 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 212 (1965) ("The government of the United States has discretion as to whether to
espouse the claim of a United States national. . . . This discretion is vested in the President
and exercised on his behalf by the Secretary of State.'). Such discretion is grounded on the
theory of espousal, which holds that the espousing sovereign has taken over the claim and is
asserting derivatively an injury to itself. Thus cast, the dispute becomes one between nations.
See generally E. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD OR THE
LAw OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 366-98 (1915); 8 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 1216-33 (1967).
124 453 U.S. at 684.
125 Among other factors, the increasing involvement of foreign nations in commercial
activities led the Department of State to adopt a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in
its "Tate Letter." Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser to the Department of
State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprintedin 26 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 984 (1952). Under the restrictive theory, "the immunity of the sovereign is recognized
with regard to sovereign or public acts ('ure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private
acts f/uregestionis)." 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952). See generaly Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba,
425 U.S. 682 (1976); Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965) (restrictive theory designed to "accommodate the inter-
est of individuals doing business with foreign governments in having their legal rights deter-
mined by the courts, with the interest of foreign governments in being free to perform certain
political acts without undergoing the embarrassment or hindrance of defending the propriety
of such acts before foreign courts').
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posed fully until 1976, when the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act126
gave United States courts jurisdiction over claims against foreign
governments. 127
The Court also concluded that the executive settlement of analo-
gous claims since 1952 justified its finding of congressional acquiescence
in the presidential action challenged in Dames & Moore. 128 The Court
listed ten such settlements of suits against foreign governments after
such suits first became cognizable in United States courts. 129 None of the
settlements, however, supports the Court's finding of congressional ac-
quiescence in the President's actions. 30 The agreements with Japan,' 31
Rumania, 32 Bulgaria, 33 and Hungary 34 were executed pursuant to
peace treaties.135 The agreements with Egypt,136 Yugoslavia,137 Po-
land,138 China, 39 and the two with Peru'40 settled expropriation claims,
which presumably could not have been prosecuted in American courts
because of the foreign nation's sovereign immunity under the FSIA' 41
and the "act of state" doctrine.142 The Court was unable to point to a
single instance in which the President has, as in Dames & Moore, settled
126 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1976).
127 See incfa notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
128 453 U.S. at 686.
129 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
130 Accord Comment, supra note 102, at 196-97.
131 Agreement on Claims: Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Apr. 18, 1969, United
States-Japan, 20 U.S.T. 2654, T.I.A.S. No. 6724.
132 Agreement on Settlement of Claims of United States Nationals, Mar. 30, 1960,
United States-Rumania, 11 U.S.T. 317, T.I.A.S. No. 4451.
133 Agreement on Claims, July 2, 1963, United States-Bulgaria, 14 U.S.T. 969, T.I.A.S.
No. 5387.
134 Agreement on Settlement of Claims, Mar. 6, 1973, United States-Hungary, 24 U.S.T.
522, T.I.A.S. No. 7569.
135 Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, T.I.A.S. No. 2490; Treaty of
Peace with Rumania, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. No. 1649; Treaty of Peace with
Bulgaria, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 1915, T.I.A.S. No. 1650; Treaty of Peace with Hungary, Feb.
10, 1947, 61 Stat. 2065, T.I.A.S. No. 1651.
136 Agreement on Claims of United States Nationals, May 1, 1976, United States-Egypt,
27 U.S.T. 4214, T.I.A.S. No. 8446.
137 Agreement on Claims of United States Nationals, Nov. 5, 1964, United States-Yugo-
slavia, 16 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 5750.
138 Agreement on Settlement of Claims of United States Nationals, July 16, 1960, United
States-Poland, 11 U.S.T. 1953, T.I.A.S. 4545.
139 Agreement on Settlement of Claims, May 11, 1979, United States-China, 30 U.S.T.
1957, T.I.A.S. No. 9306.
140 Agreement on Claims: Marcona Mining Company, Sept. 22, 1976, United States-
Peru, 27 U.S.T. 3993, T.I.A.S. No. 8417; Agreement on Settlement of Certain Claims, Feb.
19, 1974, United States-Peru, 25 U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. No. 7792.
141 The FSIA limits strictly the relief available to claimants on expropriation and nation-
alization grounds. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1976).
142 The "act of state" doctrine prohibits United States courts from examining the valid-
ity of the public acts of a foreign nation committed within its own country. See generally
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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the commercial claims of American citizens enforceable in United States
courts.
The Court purported to find a congressional "stamp of ap-
proval"1 43 on executive claim settlements in the enactment of the Inter-
national Claims Settlement Act of 1949 (ICSA),144 which established
the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. 45 This Act, however, gives
no such discretion or authority to the President. Congress enacted the
ICSA to provide for the adjudication of claims arising primarily out of
the nationalization of American property, and to allow for payment
from a lump sum paid by foreign nations to the United States.146 To
protect the rights of American claimants, Congress created the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission, 147 a tribunal independent of the execu-
tive branch. 148 Although Congress created the Commission to adjudi-
143 453 U.S. at 680.
144 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1644 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) [hereinafter cited as ICSA].
145 The Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1954, 68 Stat. 1279 (1954), abolished the Interna-
tional Claims Commission (which administered claims under the ICSA), and the War Claims
Commission (which administered claims under the War Claims Act of 1948), 50 U.S.C.
§§ 2001-2016 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), and transferred the functions of both to the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission.
146 The ICSA provides a mechanism to adjudicate claims of the United States and its
nationals "arising out of the nationalization or other taking of property." 22 U.S.C. § 1623(a)
(1976). See generally Note, Iranian Assets and Claims Settlement Agreements: A Study of Presidential
Foreign Relations Power, 56 TUL. L. R.v. 1364 (1982). The frequent amendments of the ICSA
noted by the Court, 453 U.S. at 681, fail to broaden the scope of the Act. For instance, the
China Claims Act of 1966 granted the Commission the limited authority to determine "losses
resulting from the nationalization, expropriation, intervention or other taking. . . of prop-
erty. 22 U.S.C. § 1643b (1976).
The limited nature of the prior executive claim settlements approved by Congress ex-
plains the statement in the legislative history of the IEEPA, quoted in Dames & Moore, that
"[n]othing in this act is intended . .. to impede the settlement of claims of U.S. citizens
against foreign countries." 453 U.S. at 681-82 (quoting S. REP. No. 466, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
6 (1977)). Prior to the Algerian Declarations, the President had never before attempted to
settle by executive agreement claims enforceable in United States courts. See supra notes 120-
27 and accompanying text. Congress's acceptance through the framework of the ICSA of the
President's past settlement of the claims of otherwise remediless claimants, therefore, provides
no support for the President's settlement of claims against Iran.
147 The President appoints the members of the Commission with the advice and consent
of the Senate. See Re, The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission: Its Functions andJurisdiction, 60
MICH. L. REv. 1079, 1087 (1962). The Commission is directed to apply the provisions of the
applicable claims agreement and "the applicable principles of international law, justice, and
equity." 22 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (1976). Although proceedings before the Commission are
nonadversarial, they are judicial. Re, supra, at 1089.
148 In describing the War Claims Commission, one of the precedessors of the FCSC, the
Supreme Court stated:
The final form of the legislation, as we have seen, left the widened range of
claims to be determined by adjudication. Congress could, of course, have
given jurisdiction over these claims to the District Courts or to the Court of
Claims. The fact that it chose to establish a Commission to "adjudicate ac-
cording to law" the classes of claims defined in the statute did not alter the
intrinsic judicial character of the task with which the Commission was
charged. The claims were to be "adjudicated according to the law," that is,
on the merits of each claim, supported by evidence and governing legal con-
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cate these types of claims generally, by passing legislation it has
nonetheless specifically authorized each new program that the Commis-
sion undertakes.1 49
The Court's reliance on the ICSA is also misplaced because the Al-
gerian Declarations contravene one of the primary goals of the ICSA:
providing equal treatment to all United States claimants. 50 Although
the Algerian Declarations disposed of all United States claims against
Iran, they provide for disparate treatment of various categories of claim-
ants. The Declarations satisfied immediately claims of American banks
from assets on deposit in the United States;1 5' in contrast, the agree-
ments nullified the claims of the United States hostages.152 Claims based
upon breaches of contract, such as that of Dames & Moore, received
intermediate treatment, with the possibility of future remuneration
upon adjudication by the Claims Tribunal. 53 Some claims may be
barred because the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction over contracts with
"binding" provisions requiring disputes to be settled in the Iranian
courts. '
5 4
The Court held that "Congress, though legislating in the area, has
left 'untouched' the authority of the President to enter into settlement
agreements."' 55 The contrary conclusion seems more appropriate. By
its enactment and subsequent amendments of the ICSA, Congress has
"covered the field"' 56 of permissible claim settlements by executive
agreement. The President's powers were thus at their "lowest ebb"' 57
siderations, by a body that was "entirely free from the control or coercive
influence, direct or indirect," of either the Executive or the Congress.
Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1958) (citation omitted).
149 Re, supra note 147, at 1088. For instance, the most recent program, "Claims against
Vietnam," 22 U.S.C. § 1645 (Supp. I1 1979), provides that "[i]t is the purpose of this sub-
chapter to provide for the determination of the validity and amounts of outstanding claims
against Vietnam. .. "
150 See 22 U.S.C. § 1627(e); S. REP. No. 836, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. 11-12, reprinted in 1968
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2710, 2720-2 1.
151 See REPORT ON IRAN, supra note 29, at 37-38.
152 General Declaration, supra note 1, % 11.
153 Claims Declaration, supra note 1, art. II, 1.
154 Id The provision of the Declarations requiring that these contracts be settled in Ira-
nian courts appears to be an arbitrary and largely senseless jurisdictional restriction upon
which Iran insisted.
155 453 U.S. at 682 n.10.
156 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 639 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). What Justice Frankfurter found dispositive in Youngstown is equally true here.
In denying President Truman the power to seize domestic steel mills, Frankfurter noted that
Congress had frequently provided for certain seizures by the executive in the past, but in
every case had "qualified this grant of power with limitations and safeguards." Id at 598
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Frankfurter concluded that this prior legislation demonstrated
that Congress deemed this power "so drastic . . . as to require that it be carefully circum-
scribed whenever the President was vested with this extraordinary authority." Id.
157 Id at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring); see supra note 96. The Court also suggested that
prior cases indicate that the President "does have some measure of power to enter into execu-
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when he entered into the Algerian Declarations.
3. The FSIA, Article III, and the "Tenor" of Legislation
The Court in Dames &Moore also indicated that the "general tenor"
of congressional legislation in the area of international emergencies but-
tressed its conclusion that the Congress accepted the President's ac-
tions.158 Although the Court held that neither the IEEPA nor the
tive agreements without obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate." 453 U.S. at 682.
This statement, in and of itself, is accurate. Although the Constitution does not expressly
provide for the making of international agreements other than by treaty, the vast majority of
international agreements made by the United States are executive agreements and not trea-
ties. See, e.g., Rovine, Separation of Powers and International Executive Agreements, 52 IND. L.J. 397,
406-07 (1977). The President derives the authority to make such agreements from several
provisions of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested
in a President of the United States of America."); id § 2 ("The President shall be Com-
mander in Chief of the Army and Navy ... "); id § 3 ("[Hie shall take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed . . .
Executive agreements may take two forms: "congressional executive" agreements made
pursuant to the joint authority of the President and Congress, and "sole" executive agree-
ments made by the President pursuant to his plenary foreign affairs powers. See generally W.
BIsHOP, JR., INTERNATIONAL LAw 95 (2d ed. 1962); Rovine, supra, at 412. The latter agree-
ments, totaling no more than two or three percent of all executive agreements, see id., have
generated the greatest controversy, and their scope remains unsettled. Compare Berger, supra
note 99 with McDougal & Lans, Treaties, Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Inter-
changeable Instrnents of National Poli, 54 YALE LJ. 181 (1945). See generaly L. HENKIN, supra
note 120, at 179.
The significance of the Court's statement that the President has "some measure of
power" to enter into executive agreements is dubious, especially after the Court declined to
find that the President's plenary powers extend to the making of an agreement settling Amer-
ican claims against a foreign nation. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. The two cases
that the Court cited, United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) and Ozanic v. United States,
188 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1951), do not suggest otherwise. Neither case supports the power that
the President exercised in Dames & Moore, for both predate the adoption of the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity in the United States in 1952, which first conferred enforceable
rights against foreign nations independent of executive intervention. See supra note 125 and
accompanying text.
Pink involved the Litvinov Assignment, an executive agreement entered into with the
Soviet Union. The Court carefully noted that no United States creditors were adversely af-
fected by the Agreement: "The contest here is between the United States and creditors of the
Russian corporation who, we assume, are not citizens of this country. . . ." 315 U.S. at 227.
Moreover, Pink involved the President's power to enter into executive agreements with for-
eign governments incidental to his Article II, § 3 recognition powers. In Pink "[i]t was the
judgment of the political department that full recognition of the Soviet government required
the settlement of all outstanding problems including the claims of our nationals. Recognition
and the Litvinov Assignment were interdependent." Id at 230. Finally, Congress had "tac-
itly" approved the Litvinov Assignment by authorizing, in anticipation of the Agreement,
claims of American nationals against the Soviet government. See Joint Resolution of Aug. 4,
1939, 53 Stat. 1199; see also 315 U.S. at 227-28. The language quoted from Ozanic was dictum
because the settlement was made under an express congressional delegation of power, the
"Lend-Lease Act," 22 U.S.C. §§ 411-419; see also 188 F.2d at 231-32.
158 453 U.S. at 678. The Court stated that the "failure of Congress specifically to dele-
gate authority does not, 'especially. . .in the areas of foreign policy and national security,'
imply 'congressional disapproval' of action taken by the Executive." Id (quoting Haig v.
Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981)). The Court's reliance on Haig is unfounded. Htaig stands for
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Hostage Act directly authorized the President's suspension of American
claims, 59 it found that both acts indirectly supported a "broad scope for
executive action."''0 The Court viewed the IEEPA as delegating broad
authority to the President to act in times of national emergency with
respect to the property of foreign nations.16' Similarly, the Court read
the Hostage Act as a delegation to the President of broad discretion in
responding to the hostile acts of foreign sovereigns.162
Although the Court's argument may have some force with respect
to claims against foreign governments that are not cognizable in United
States courts, the "general tenor" of legislation is irrelevant to the execu-
tive settlement of claims covered by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976.163 Congress enacted the FSIA to achieve two primary
objectives: first, Congress intended the FSIA to codify the "restrictive"
principle of sovereign immunity and enable American citizens with
commercial claims to sue foreign sovereigns in United States courts;164
no more than the established proposition that in the area of foreign affairs, congressional
silence in the face of "a consistent administrative construction of [a] statute" will not be
equated with congressional disapproval. Id The issue in Dames &Moore, however, was not
the proper scope of presidential power under an express delegation from Congress, but the
authority of the President in the absence of such a delegation. See supra notes 115-17 and
accompanying text.




163 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1976).
164 Although the State Department had adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign im-
munity, see supra note 125, the Department often found it politically infeasible to resist the
pressures from foreign governments to recognize their immunity from suit:
From the standpoint of the private litigant, considerable uncertainty results.
A private party who deals with a foreign government entity cannot be certain
that his legal dispute with a foreign state will not be decided on the basis of
nonlegal considerations through the foreign government's intercession with
the Department of State.
H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
6604 [hereinafter cited as FSIA HousE REPORT]. This uncertainty engendered problems for
United States foreign policy as well as for private litigants. During the committee hearings on
the FSIA, the Legal Adviser to the State Department noted:
I can't think of any [advantages] and may I say that I think there are some
disadvantages attaching to the power of being able to enter a political judg-
ment in the court because it means that the State Department becomes in-
volved in a great many cases where we would rather not do anything at all,
but where there is enormous pressure from the foreign government that we do
something. . . . [I]n practice I would have to say to you in candor that the
State Department, being a political institution, has not always been able to
resist these pressures. And to my way of thinking, this consideration of polit-
ical factors is, in fact, the very antithesis of the rule of law which we would
like to see established.
Jurisdiction of US Courts in Suits Against Foreign States, 1976 Hearings on HR. 11315 Before the
Subcomnu. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on theJudiciay, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 34-35 (testimony of Mr. Leigh) [hereinafter cited as FISA House Hearings
(1976)].
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second, Congress wanted to depoliticize these commercial lawsuits by
placing the determination of claims of sovereign immunity exclusively
in the hands of the judiciary, free of executive-branch interference. 165
Under the FSIA, foreign governments still enjoy immunity from
suit in many cases.166 In such instances, the President presumably may
still invoke espousal powers.1 67 The "general tenor" of international
emergency legislation may assist in defining the scope of the traditional
executive power to settle these claims. When the FSIA enables claimants
to sue a foreign state in American courts, however, executive interfer-
ence with jurisdiction, not executive powers of espousal, are at issue.
The "general tenor" of such legislation as the IEEPA and the Hostage
Act is irrelevant to an inquiry into the President's power to divest
United States courts of jurisdiction specifically conferred by Congress.
The Court rejected the argument that the President's suspension of
lawsuits against Iran violated Article III of the Constitution by circum-
scribing the jurisdiction of the courts that the FSIA conferred.1 68 The
165 FSIA HOUSE REPORT, sup-a note 164, at 7; accord von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 45, 65 (1978). Congress considered
and rejected proposals to allow presidential intervention in suits during times of international
emergency. The State and Justice Departments originally drafted the FSIA to be "subject to
existing andlfuture international agreements." H.R. 11315, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1604 (1976)
(emphasis added). Although prior to the enactment of the FSIA, the executive branch could,
for political reasons, suggest immunity from suit for foreign nations otherwise susceptible to
claims, Congress rejected that power in enacting the FSIA. Congress heard testimony that
the continuation of the practice of executive recommendations of immunity was important.
FSIA House Hearings, supra note 164, at 65-66 (testimony of Mr. Michael Cardozo). The
Chairman of the House Subcommittee, Rep. Flowers, disagreed and instead agreed with a
later witness "that the so-called flexibility the State Department has under any present prac-
tice [ofsuggesting immunity to achieve a political goal]. . . is achieved at a price that is paid
by some individual citizen or corporation. That is not the way this Government does business
and it is not the way we ought to do business." Id at 90. Congress deleted from the FSIA the
reference to "future international agreements" to ensure that the jurisdiction of the courts to
make determinations of sovereign immunity would be untouched by the President. See FSIA
HOUSE REPORT, sufra note 164, at 10 ("[I]t was thought best to eliminate any possible ques-
tion that this language might be construed to authorize a future international agreement.");
S. REP. No. 1310, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976) ("Mention of future agreements was found to
be unnecessary and misleading.').
Congress clearly intended to divest the President of the power to use jurisdiction as a
bargaining chip in international political negotiations. Professor Carl, in a prescient article
published after the passage of the FSIA but before the Iranian Hostage Crisis, wrote:
Assume American hostages are being held by a foreign government. While
negotiating for their release, the United States government wishes to offer as a
quid pro quo the termination of pending litigation against that nation within
this country. Under the FSIA, the executive would have no such authority ....
Carl, Suing Foreign Governments in American Courts: The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act in Practice, 33 Sw. LJ. 1009, 1063 (1979) (emphasis added).
166 For instance, the FSIA does not confer jurisdiction on United States courts to hear
most expropriation and tort claims. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(3), (5) (1976) (detailing the
limited tort and expropriation claims that can be brought against foreign sovereigns).
167 See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
168 Article III provides: "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
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Court held that the President had not terminated lawsuits against Iran,
but only suspended them, pending their final determination by the
Claims Tribunal. 169 The Court reasoned that the Suspension Order
had not divested the courts of jurisdiction, but had only "direct[ed] the
courts to apply a different rule of law."' 170 The Court concluded, there-
fore, that the President in exercising his power to settle claims had "sim-
ply effected a change in the substantive law governing the lawsuit."171
It is plain why the Court strove to avoid characterizing the Presi-
dent's action as "jurisdictional." When dealing with presidential action
.arguably within "a zone of twilight,"'172 the distribution of power is un-
certain and the Court has some leeway. The President's power to settle
claims173 is at least arguably within the "zone of twilight." Jurisdiction,
however, is not in that zone. The President possesses no constitutional
authority to affect the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Only Congress,
under Article III of the Constitution, possesses that power. 74 To avoid
the dictates of Article III, the Court needed to characterize the Presi-
dent's Suspension Order 175 as a change in substantive law rather than a
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added).
169 Although the Suspension Order "suspended" all claims that "may be presented" to
the Claims Tribunal, Exec. Order No. 12294, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 139 (1982), the Algerian Declara-
tions obligate the United States "to nullify all attachments and judgements," ".to terminate
all legal proceedings in United States Courts," and "to prohibit all further litigation based on
such claims." General Declaration, supra note 1, B, at 224.
170 453 U.S. at 685.
171 Id
172 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring); see supra note 96.
173 See supra notes 118-57 and accompanying text.
174 The scope of Congress's power to affect the jurisdiction of the courts remains uncer-
tain. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858
(1982); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). See generall, Hart, The Power of
Congress to Limit theJurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362
(1953); Sager, Forward- Constitutional Limitations on Congress'Authority to Regulate theJurisdiction of
the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REv. 17 (1981). It is indisputable, however, that no matter
how great the crisis, the President has no such power. See, e.g., Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2, 121 (1866) (striking down President Lincoln's attempt during the Civil War to trans-
fer jurisdiction over civilians from the courts to a military tribunal). Not only is the President
without inherent authority to limit federal court jurisdiction, but Congress may not delegate
such authority to him:
Notwithstanding the deference each branch must accord the others, the "judi-
cial Power of the United States" vested in the federal courts by Art. III, § 1, of
the Constitution can no more be shared with the Executive Branch than the
Chief Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto power, or
the Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override a Presidential
veto. Any other conclusion would be contrary to the basic concept of separa-
tion of powers and the checks and balances that flow from the scheme of a
tripartite government.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974); see also Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948).
'75 Exec. Order No. 12,294, 3 C.F.R. 129 (1982).
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divestiture of jurisdiction.
However understandable the Court's characterization effort may
be, it does more justice to Lewis Carroll than to legal scholarship. Dames
&Moore, like most of the .cases affected by the Suspension Order, was a
breach of contract suit. The Suspension Order had no effect on the sub-
stantive contract and remedies law that governed the lawsuit. To the
contrary, the Order did nothing more than transfer the litigation from
one forum to another. It is legal hocus-pocus to categorize this as any-
thing but jurisdictional. 176
The order that the Court upheld is arguably a "suspension" of
claims in form, but it is in effect a termination of most claims. Although
claims not cognizable by the Claims Tribunal possibly may revive and
become judicially enforceable in United States courts, 177 the determina-
tion of the Claims Tribunal under the Suspension Order is final for
claims that the Tribunal recognizes. Whether the Tribunal issues an
award or rejects a cognizable claim, the adjudication "operate[s] as a
final resolution and discharge of the claim for all purposes."' 78 There-
fore, legal proceedings in the United States courts on claims cognizable
by the Tribunal are in effect terminated.1 79
Even for claims not cognizable before the Claims Tribunal, the
Court nowhere explains why "suspension" of the statutorily-conferred
right to proceed in the United States district courts, subject to a possible
176 The Court has defined jurisdiction as the "power to entertain the suit, consider the
merits and render a binding decision thereon . . . ." General Inv. Co. v. New York Cent.
R.R., 271 U.S. 228, 230 (1926). In the succinct words of Justice Holmes: "Jurisdiction is
authority to decide the case either way." The Fair v. Kohler Die & Speciality Co., 228 U.S.
22, 25 (1913).
177 453 U.S. at 687. The Supreme Court assumed that claimants excluded from the
Claims Tribunal had a right to seek redress in United States courts, but the right is not
settled. Indeed, the United States specifically agreed in the Algerian Declarations to "termi-
nate" all legal proceedings in the United States courts. See rupra note 169. In October 1982,
Iran filed a number of claims against the United States in the Claims Tribunal based upon
alleged violations of the Algerian Declarations. Prominent among the alleged violations is the
United States' suspension, rather than termination, of lawsuits against Iran. See Statement of
Claims of the Islamic Republic of Iran Based Upon Violations by the United States of the
Algiers Declarations at 68-76, reprinted in IRANIAN Ass. Ts LIGATION REP. (Andrews) 5423-
25 (Oct. 22, 1982).
178 Exec. Order No. 12,294, § 4, 3 C.F.R. 139-40 (1982).
179 One lower court held:
Whether the executive is attempting to foreclose United States citizens
from access to United States courts to vindicate rights obtained by contract
wholly performed within the United- States, such as in the case at bar, by
"termination" or "suspension," the intent is the same. While it may be that
"suspending" the claims without limit is more acceptable in a public relations
sense than "terminating" or "nullifying" the claims, the result in either case is
to prevent claimants from asserting their right in federal court. I must deal
with the reality rather than niceties of language. "A rose by any other name
... " Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act. II, Scene 2, Lines 41-42.
Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69, 83 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 657 F.2d 3
(2d Cir. 1981).
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right of "revival" if the alternative forum fails to act on the merits, 18 0 is
not jurisdictional. The change of forum mandated by the "suspension"
appears as much a jurisdictional change as a transfer pursuant to Title
28 of the United States Code, section 1404 (change of venue), t81 section
1407 (multidistrict litigation), 82 or removal pursuant to sections 1441-
1451.183 A change in forum is no less jurisdictional merely because it
may not be permanent.
Additionally, the President's Suspension Order itself defies the
Supreme Court's assertion that his actions affected substantive law
rather than jurisdiction. The order defines with some particularity the
permitted jurisdiction of United States courts. The Order permits
claimants to commence an action to toll a statute of limitations 84 and
to assert a counterclaim or set-off in any legal action that Iran brings. 185
The Order further provides that the courts need not dismiss any action
for want'of prosecution.186
Finally, the Court nowhere explained how the President's interna-
tional agreement can change the substantive law governing litigation in
United States courts. Clearly a treaty, as the law of the land, can
change substantive law. Executive agreements, however, although they
can commit the United States internationally, cannot change substan-
tive domestic law. 187
180 See supra note 177.
181 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1976).
182 Id § 1407 (1976).
183 Id §§ 1441-1451 (1976).
184 Exec. Order No. 12,294, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 139 (1982).
185 Id § 6, 3 C.F.R. 140.
186 Id § 2, 3 C.F.R. 139.
187 A treaty and an executive agreement have the same legal effect under international
law. See, e.g., Moore, Contemporaq Issues in an Ongoing Debate: The Roles of Congress and the Presi-
dent in Foreign Affairs, 7 INT'L LAW. 733, 739 (1973) ("At the outset, we should be clear about
what the issue is. It is not the international authority of treaties as opposed to executive agree-
ments. . . .The issue is rather the constitutional authority of the President, the President and
the Senate, or the President and the Congress to enter into international agreements."). The
domestic effect of an executive agreement, however, differs from that of a treaty. An executive
agreement, unlike a treaty, cannot override a prior act of Congress. Cf. United States v. Guy
W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 658, 660 (4th Cir. 1953) (voiding executive agreement with
Canada regarding the importation of potatoes because it conflicted with a prior law enacted
by Congress under its power to regulate foreign commerce), a fdon other grounds, 348 U.S. 296
(1955); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 144 (1963) ("An executive agreement, made by the United States without reference to a
treaty or an act of Congress,. .. does not supersede inconsistent provisions of earlier acts of
Congress.').
The drafters of the Restatement appear to favor a different rule. Tentative Draft No. 1 of
the RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 135 (rev.
draft 1981) provides that: "A rule of international law or a provision of an agreement that
becomes effective as law in the United States supersedes any inconsistent law of the several
states of the United States, as well as any inconsistent preexisting provision in the law of the
United States." Reporters' Note 6 to that section recognizes that "[i]t has been commonly
assumed that. . . a sole executive agreement. . . cannot supersede an earlier treaty or act of
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The Court relied on the holding in United States v. Schooner Peggy1 88
to support the argument that the Suspension Order merely effected a
change in substantive law. 189 The case involved a French ship, the
Schooner Peggy, which the United States captured in the year 1800.
The Circuit Court for the District of Connecticut found that the
Schooner Peggy was an armed French vessel captured on the high seas
and was therefore a lawful prize. Consequently, one-half of the ship and
its cargo became the property of the United States, and the other half
became the property of the officers and crew of the capturing ship, the
Trumbull, a ship "duly commissioned by the President of the United
Sta*tes" to capture armed French vessels found on the high seas. 19°
While the case was pending on appeal to the Supreme Court, the Presi-
dent ratified a peace treaty with France which provided that property
captured "and not yet defnitively condemned. . . shall be mutually re-
stored."1 91 The Court held that the treaty controlled the case and de-
nied recovery.
The Court has cited the Schooner Pegg for the broad proposition
that courts of appeal should retroactively apply new substantive law un-
less "manifest injustice" would result. 92 The case, however, provides no
precedential support for the Court's conclusion in Dames & Moore that
the President's actions changed only the substantive law governing the
claims. First, in Schooner Peggy, the President's actions did in fact change
the substantive law. When Trumbull's crew captured the Schooner
Peggy, the law of war prevailed, while the Peace Treaty governed the
case when it came before the Supreme Court. Thus the treaty changed
the substantive law, not the Court's jurisdiction over the case. In Dames
&Moore, on the other hand, the Algerian Declarations in reality only
affected jurisdiction.193
Congress," but states that "a valid sole executive agreement is federal law and American
jurisprudence has not known federal law of different status under the Constitution." No
court has adopted this rule, and the drafters themselves recognize that "even if a sole execu-
tive agreement were held to supersede a statute, Congress could proceed to reenact the statute
and thereby supersede the intervening executive agreement as domestic law." Id Reporter's
Note 6.
The Supreme Court addressed, but did not resolve, the issue in Weinberger v. Rossi, 102
S. Ct. 1510 (1982). Holding that an executive agreement constituted a "treaty" for the pur-
poses of a specific federal statute, the Court stated: "Even though [executive] agreements are
not treaties under the Treaty Clause of the Constitution, they may in appropriate circumstances
have an effect similar to treaties in some areas of domestic law." Id at 1514 n.6 (emphasis
added).
188 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 103 (1801).
189 453 U.S. at 685.
190 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 106-07.
191 Id at 107.
192 See sufira notes 168-83 and accompanying text.
193 Courts will refuse to apply intervening substantive law within the meaning of Schooner
Peggy if "manifest injustice" would result. Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696,
711 (1974) (dictum); Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 282 (1969) (dictum). The dan-
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Second, the President in Schooner Peggy ratified a treaty, while the
President in Dames & Moore entered into an executive agreement. The
distinction becomes significant in light of the Schooner Peggy Court's em-
phasis on the constitutional force of a treaty on the substantive law of
the land:
The constitution of the United States declares a treaty to be the
supreme law of the land. Of consequence its obligation on the courts
of the United States must be admitted. It is certainly true that the
execution of a contract between nations is to be demanded from, and,
in the general, superintended by the executive of each nation, and
therefore, whatever the decision of this court may be relative to the
rights of parties litigating before it, the claim upon the nation if unsat-
isfied, may still be asserted. But yet where a treaty is the law of the
land, and as such affects the rights of parties litigating in court, that
treaty as much binds those rights and is as much to be regarded by the
court as an act of congress .... 194
In contrast, an executive agreement, such as that in Dames &Moore, has
no such constitutional force.1 95
In Persinger v. Iran, 196 the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia also rejected the argument that the executive or-
ders implementing the Algerian Declarations unlawfully circumscribed
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The District of Columbia Circuit
ger of such injustice is particularly great when the rights of private litigants are at stake. See,
e.g., Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 417 U.S. at 717 (dictum); cf. Schooner Pegg, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 103, 110 (1801) ("[Iun mere private cases between individuals, a court will and ought
to struggle hard against a construction which will, by a retrospective operation, affect the
rights of parties. . . ."). The reluctance of courts to apply a law retroactively when private
litigants are involved is also arguably warranted in actions by a private litigant against a
foreign nation under the FSIA, because the FSIA renders a foreign state liable to suit "to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1976).
194 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 103, 109-10 (1801).
195 See supra note 187 and accompanying text. The Court also noted, as an argument
reductio ad absurdu, that if sovereign immunity were jurisdictional, "the President's determi-
nation of a foreign state's sovereign immunity" prior to enactment of the FSIA would have
been an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the courts. 453 U.S. at 685. Although prior to
the enactment of the FISA, courts routinely accepted the President's sovereign immunity
"suggestions" as "conclusive determinations," Exparle Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943), this did
not affect the power of the courts. As one district court noted: "This course entails no abro-
gation ofjudicial power;, it is a self-imposed restraint to avoid embarrassment of the executive
in the conduct of foreign affairs." New York & Cuba Mail S.S. v. Koria, 132 F. Supp. 684,
688 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); see also Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945); axpare Peru, 318
U.S. at 588.
Regardless of how one characterizes State Department suggestions of immunity and ju-
dicial acceptance of such suggestions in the past, the FSIA is an exercise of Congress's consti-
tutional power to regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Under the FSIA, Congress
codified the restrictive principle of sovereign immunity, permitting commercial suits against
foreign sovereigns in the United States courts, and delegated the exclusive responsibility for
interpreting the Act and making determinations of immunity to the courts. The Suspension
Order clearly encroaches upon this jurisdictional grant.
196 690 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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based its decision on grounds different from, but no more satisfactory
than, those of the Court in Dames & Moore. In Persinger, a former hos-
tage and his parent sued the government of Iran for damages inflicted
by the seizure and detention of the hostages in Tehran. The plaintiffs
challenged the President's power to divest the United States courts of
jurisdiction by extinguishing hostage claims against Iran. 9 7
The court of appeals could not rely on Dames & Moore because it
had rejected the jurisdictional argument on the grounds that Executive
Order No. 12,284 suspended, rather than terminated, claims. In con-
trast, Executive Order No. 12,283 extinguished hostage claims with no
provision for resolution before an alternative forum. Noting that "a
very serious problem would be presented for decision" if the President
had attempted to deprive the courts of jurisdiction, 198 Judge Bork con-
cluded that the President had made no such attempt, because Executive
Order No. 12,283 and the implementing regulations "are addressed to
persons, not to courts--one index of a legal change rather than a juris-
diction divestiture."' 99 Because it is not apparent on its face that Execu-
tive Order No. 12,283 and implementing regulations address persons
and not courts, the court of appeals devoted several paragraphs to sup-
porting this conclusion. The court explained that this interpretation
was "a more natural reading"; that under the circumstances, any ambi-
guities in language should be resolved in favor of the President, and that
even if the contrary interpretation was "more probably the correct one,
courts have more than once allowed the pressure of a constitutional issue
to influence their interpretation of language. ' '2°°
The effort to characterize Executive Order No. 12,283 as addressed
to persons, and not to courts, is labored at best. But even if one grants
this premise, it is not clear why the conclusion follows that the change is
not jurisdictional. To Judge Bork and his fellow judges, it is axiomatic
that language addressed to persons effects a change in substantive law
rather than in subject matter jurisdiction. But they advance no reasons
to support this assumption, and it is hardly self-evident. Unless seman-
tics are to govern, a rule regulating access to courts is jurisdictional,
whether that result is achieved by directing the courts not to hear cer-
tain classes of cases or by directing persons not to institute certain types
of proceedings. 20'
197 Exec. Order No. 12,283 and the implementing regulations prohibit, inter alia, "any
person subject to U.S. jurisdiction" from prosecuting any claim against the Government of
Iran arising out of the seizure of the hostages or their subsequent detention. Exec. Order No.
12,283, 3 C.F.R. 114 (1981).
198 690 F.2d at 1016. Judge Bork characterized any alleged presidential power to alter
subject matter jurisdiction as "an awesome power" of "dubious constitutionality." Id
199 Id.
200 Id
201 The court of appeals could have avoided the jurisdictional issue altogether by finding,
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CONCLUSION: THE PRESIDENT'S POWERS AFTER DAMES & MOORE
The Court in Dames & Moore intended "to lay down no general
'guidelines' "202 and attempted to confine its decision "to the very ques-
tions necessary to decision of the case."1203 If the decision could be lim-
ited to the exigencies of the hostage crisis, perhaps no harm would be
done. The decision's effects, however, cannot be so easily confined. 20 4
To uphold the President's nullification of attachments obtained by
American litigants against Iranian property in the United States, the
Court had to interpret.the IEEPA broadly. Although Congress enacted
the IEEPA to restrict the President's national emergency powers, as con-
strued in Dames &Moore the IEEPA grants the President powers perhaps
even greater than those that the TWEA previously conferred. 205 The
Court's interpretation provides no effective limits on the President's
power to dispose of foreign assets as he sees fit during a national
emergency.
The Court, for the first time, also upheld the power of the President
to remove from the jurisdiction of United States courts the commercial
.claims of American citizens against foreign nations and to dispose of
them upon whatever terms he chooses. The Court's attempt to limit its
holding by characterizing the case as the resolution of a "major" foreign
policy dispute does not provide a workable limiting guideline.20 6 Al-
as did the district court, that the FSIA barred jurisdiction. Instead, the court of appeals
specifically found that jurisdiction was not barred, holding that the phrase, damages "occur-
ring in the United States" as used in the FSIA, see 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1976), included the
American Embassy in Iran. See Persinger, 690 F.2d at 1017. Having found jurisdiction under
the FSIA, the court of appeals held that the President's authority to settle international
claims permitted him to extinguish hostage claims. For this holding, the court of appeals
relied on the dubious legislation-by-acquiescence theory advanced in Dames & Moore. The
court of appeals, however, went even beyond the holding in Dames &Moore, which had held
only that Congress had acquiesced in the practice of disposing of the claims of Americans
against foreign sovereigns when a sum of money or an alternative forum was provided. The
Persinger court, in contrast, found a broader acquiescence: "Congress has acquiesced in presi-
dential authority to dispose of claims when important foreign policy considerations were at
stake." Id at 1022.
202 453 U.S. at 661.
203 Id
204 See also Howard, Implications of the Iranian Assets Case for American Buness, 16 INT'L
LAW. 128, 134 (1982); Comment, The Iranian Hostage Agreement Cases: The Evolving Presidential
Claims Settlement Power, 35 Sw. LJ. 1055, 1077 (1982). That courts may not limit Dames &
Moore to its facts is already evident. One subsequent case, for example, has characterized
Dames &Moore as "sustaining the exclusive power of the President in the sphere of interna-
tional relations." United States v. Fernandez-Pertierra, 523 F. Supp. 1135, 1141 (S.D. Fla.
1981). But see Worthington v. Fauver, 180 NJ. Super. 368, 375, 434 A.2d 1134, 1138 (1981)
(Dames &Moore supports the proposition that "[a] case which seeks to declare an executive
action unconstitutional as usurpation of or intrusion into the constitutional power of another
coequal branch of government stirs any court to a sense of caution in its approach and to a
realization of the requirement that its decision be based upon the narrowest possible ground
capable of deciding the case.").
205 See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
206 453 U.S. at 688 ("[W]here, as here, the settlement of claims has been determined to be
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though the taking of the hostages was a "major" crisis, nowhere in Dames
& Moore does the Court provide criteria for distinguishing major from
less-than-major disputes; nor would such a standard be appropriate.
The foreign affairs powers of the President do not expand or contract
with the relative severity of the dispute in issue. As Justice Douglas
stated in Youngstown: "[T]he emergency did not create power; it merely
marked an occasion when power should be exercised. '20 7
Finally, the Court held in Dames &Moore that Congress had acqui-
esced in the President's settlement 208 of the claims of United States citi-
zens against foreign nations, and that the acquiescence was tantamount
to an express congressional delegation. 20 9 The Court reasoned that be-
cause Congress had not enacted legislation or passed a resolution indi-
cating its displeasure with the Algerian Declarations, and because it had
not "resisted the exercise of Presidential authority," Congress had acqui-
esced in the President's agreement.210 The Court thus implicitly created
a necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute between our country
and another. . . we are not prepared to say that the President lacks the power to settle such
claims.").
207 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 629 (1952) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
208 The use of the term "settlement" throughout Dames &Moore appears to be a misno-
mer. Dames & Moore and other American claimants have received no compensation in set-
tlement of their claims. To the contrary, they have lost their judgments and the security of an
American forum for adjudication of their claims. In the words of Judge Duffy in Marschalk
Co. v. Iran Nat'I Airlines Corp.:
Even assuming for the moment that the President has the constitutional au-
thority to settle claims, I seriously question that the President actually "set-
tled" the claims of Marschalk and the other plaintiffs under the Agreement
with Iran. The term "settlement" implies that the plaintiffs receive some-
thing of value in exchange for the termination of adjudicative proceedings in
United States courts of their claims. In the instant cases, nothing has been
received in exchange for the suspension of litigation in the United States. In-
stead, Marschalk and the other plaintiffs must still seek satisfaction of their
claims. They, however, have lost their rights to litigate in the United States
courts and are forced to pursue their claims before an arbitral tribunal lo-
cated in a foreign country. They also lose the guarantees of due process af-
forded by the United States courts as well as the right of appeal.
Furthermore, if successful on the merits of the Tribunal, the plaintiffs may
only receive as little as 20 cents on a dollar since the identified claims of
United States citizens against Iran and its instrumentalities exceed by over
five times the amount Iran has put in the settlement fund.
518 F. Supp. 69, 88 (S.D.N.Y.), reo'd, 657 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1981).
209 See supra notes 96-157 and accompanying text.
210 453 U.S. at 688. One must question whether the Court in Dames & Moore accorded
undue significance to Congress's failure to object to the Algerian Declarations. First, congres-
sional reaction was mixed. Compare Iran Hearings, supra note 34, at 2 ("In my judgment, these
matters have been handled with extraordinary skill.") (statement of Sen. Percy) with id at
135 (fulfillment of the agreements "involves our utter humiliation in the eyes of the entire
world') (statement of Sen. Hayakawa). Congress's generally muted response demonstrates
less of an acceptance of the President's authority than a realization that it had been presented
with afail accompl, and that America's international stature might be damaged if it were to
repudiate the President's undertaking. Id at 67-68. The remarks of Senator Percy support
this conclusion. Repudiation of the Agreements, he noted,
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a presumption of legislative acquiescence in executive agreements, ab-
sent specific congressional disapproval. The absence of congressional
disapproval surely cannot be the determinative factor in a finding of
acquiescence, for it would give the President powers unchecked by judi-
cial review and subject only to the ultimate veto of Congress. Such a
rule would contravene the basic principles of our constitutional scheme
of government. 21'
After Dames &Moore, absent congressional action, a President may,
by executive agreement, suspend and effectively terminate the enforce-
able claims of American citizens in United States courts. Adherence to
this rule effectively obliterates the rights of American claimants against
Iran and creates an unwieldy standard of congressional delegation by
acquiescence. Because the Court held that the President possesses no
plenary power to make such a settlement, and because congressional
powers are "not lost by being allowed to lie dormant," 212 Congress re-
tains the power to reverse this holding with an unambiguous expression
of a contrary intent. Congress would do well to heed the words of warn-
ing Justice Jackson directed to it three decades ago:
If not good law, there was worldly wisdom in the maxim attributed to
Napoleon that "The tools belong to the man who can use them." We
may say that power to legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands
of Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping
through its fingers.213
would increase tremendously the Soviet influence in that vital part of the
world. It would cause a wave of reaction against us, I think all over the
world, certainly by some of our best friends, but also certainly within Iran
... I think [repudiation] would be looked upon as a dishonorable act. I
think it would show a lack of continuity between administrations ....
Those who would have egged us and goaded us into renouncing this agree-
ment in the end I think would have harmed American interests really irrepa-
rably.. . . I dont know of any international support for repudiation.
Id at 67-68.
211 A scheme of government like ours no doubt at times feels the lack of power to
act with complete, all-embracing, swiftly moving authority. No doubt a gov-
ernment with distributed authority, subject to be challenged in the courts of
law, at least long enough to consider and adjudicate the challenge, labors
under restrictions from which other governments are free. It has not been our
tradition to envy such governments. In any event our government was
designed to have such restrictions. The price was deemed not too high in view
of the safeguards which these restrictions afford.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 613 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
212 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 647 (1950).
213 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 654 (Jackson, J., concurring);
cf Kurland, The Impotence of Reticence, 1968 DuKE LJ. 619, 633-34 ("Congress might well
choose to put on the facade of the literally crumbling capitol the words: 'The fault, dear
Brutus, lies not in the stars, but in ourselves, that we are underlings.' ").
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